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Abstract: Since 1956 when crude oil was first discovered in commercial 
quantity at Oloibiri, the Niger Delta region in Nigeria has remained the 
country’s crude oil producing area.  Crude oil is the chief source of revenue 
for Nigeria, yet, according to the UNDP’s Human Development Report 2015, 
the region with a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.514 remains the least 
developed crude oil producing region in the world. This means that the region 
is underdeveloped, hence the feeling of injustice, neglect and marginalization 
among its people. Another UNDP Niger Delta 2006 Report states that the 
entire Nigeria is also underdeveloped and riddled with material poverty. It is 
the concern of this study to find out why despite the revenue boom from oil, 
Nigeria has remained underdeveloped and how this can affect the unity of the 
country? This is coming as a result of the intensity of the underdevelopment 
of Nigeria and the region in particular and the prevalence of insecurity in the 
country. We examined the natural resource literature of the resource curse to 
explain and gain insight into why despite the revenue from crude oil, Nigeria 
has remained underdeveloped and how this underdevelopment can result in a 
national crisis that can collapse the country. Secondary sources were used to 
access data for analysis. Qualitative data analysis method was used to analyze 
data. The study finds that the continued underdevelopment of Nigeria and the 
Niger Delta in particular can lead to a national revolt capable of splintering 
Nigeria into national pieces. It is the recommendation of the study that the 
political leadership of Nigeria should quickly provide good governance that 
can take the Niger Delta and indeed the entire country out of the cold hands of 
underdevelopment. 
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1. Introduction 
Crude oil is a natural resource and like 
all natural resources, it is available to 
man for use. Its usage comes with 
moral, economic, political and 
environmental implications especially in 
Third World economies. In Nigeria, 
crude oil exploration started in 1937, 
and its discovery in commercial 
quantities in 1956 and continued 
exploitation in the Niger Delta region 
have been on till date (Tamuno, 2011: 1-
12). Revenue from the sale of oil 
belongs totally to the Federal 
Government of Nigeria based on its 
laws. A little amount of the revenue 
(13%) is shared to the oil producing 
Niger Delta States; but to the people of 
the region, that is not enough to develop 
the area and therefore they see this as 
unjust and iniquitous (Tamuno, 2011: 
9). Hence they demand for resource 
control, fiscal federalism and self-
determination. Based on the 
monumental literature on the Niger 
Delta, this whole struggle and agitation 
has been summarized as the Niger Delta 
Question. The issues in this question 
include the feeling of injustice, 
marginalization and inequity; neglect of 
the despoiled and degraded 
environment; lack of quality 
infrastructure; ravaging poverty, 
unemployment and underdevelopment 
(Tamuno, (2011: 321-325). 
 
Year in year out, Nigeria has always 
been classified under the UNDP’s HDI 
Reports as an underdeveloped country 
despite the huge oil revenue at its 
disposal. According to Ross (2003:2): 
“Why has Nigeria’s remarkable oil 
wealth done so little to raise incomes 
and alleviate poverty?” This study is 
interested in finding out why Nigeria 
has not been able to use this revenue to 
develop the country? What are the 
implications of this inability on the 
survival of the country as a political 
society? The key concern of this study is 
that if Nigeria does not become 
developed and move its people out of 
poverty, the rest of Nigeria may 
combine with the already volatile Niger 
Delta and constitute a formidable mass 
movement that can collapse the country, 
as it happened in the former Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 
December, 1990 (Beissinger, 2009). 
This study will explore answers to these 
questions using the natural resource 
curse theory by looking at its literature, 
its implications for a natural resource 
dominated economy towards its 
development and the other possible 
factors that will be instigated by the 
Niger Delta struggle to tear Nigeria into 
pieces.  
 
2.0 Literature Review 
2.1 What is a Natural Resource? 
Natural resources are materials or 
physical things that no man created; 
they exist from nature and have been 
there right from the beginning of life on 
earth. Therefore they include everything 
we can see and those we cannot easily 
see but exist. The issues that make these 
free gifts of nature important are their 
location, ownership and utility. Hence, 
most definitions are about these issues. 
 
According to the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), natural resources 
are natural assets occurring in nature 
that can be used for economic 
production or consumption. This 
definition dwelt on the value or utility of 
natural resources. Again that they can be 
used for economic production implies 
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that they can be processed into other 
goods needed by man.  Also it stated 
that natural resources “occur in nature”, 
that means, they are not created by man 
or did not pass any process of creation 
by man. However, the definition is 
limited by location and ownership. 
Another view by the UNESCO states 
that:  
Natural resources, in a broad 
sense, include everything that is 
derivable for the use of man from 
any part of the universe. In the 
physical sphere they include 
energy from sunshine and gravity 
as well as mineral deposits and the 
rain. In the biological sphere they 
include domesticated as well as 
wild plants and animals; and they 
include human resources too 
(UNESCO, 1964: 2). 
 
This definition gave a composite of 
natural resources to include energy from 
sunshine and gravity, mineral deposits, 
rain, plants, animals and human beings. 
It went further to indicate that natural 
resources are located in the universe and 
that they are for man’s use, which attests 
to their utility significance. The location 
is not specific: where exactly the 
resources are located? Thus the 
definition is deficient in location and 
ownership. 
On the part of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), it defined natural 
resources as “ stock of materials that 
exist in the natural environment that are 
both scarce and economically useful in 
the production or consumption, either in 
their raw state or after a minimal 
amount of processing” (WTO, 2010:46). 
Again this definition emphasized 
economic sense and usefulness of 
natural resources and is deficient in the 
rest issues about natural resources. What 
else would one expect from WTO as a 
trade manager!  
This research will define natural 
resources as useful raw materials 
located in a defined political society 
(community, state or country), owned 
by that society and capable of been 
processed into other forms of 
commodities to meet the needs of man. 
Natural resources are capable of 
ensuring the stability of the ecological 
systems where they exist. Examples of 
natural resources are, natural water, 
crude oil, limestone, diamonds, 
platinum, coal, cotton plants, 
unprocessed gas, copper, trees, bauxite 
ore, iron ore, gold, manganese, cobalt 
and  fishes.  
 
2.2 Ownership of a Natural Resource 
Natural resources should be owned by 
people who own the land and area 
where such resources are located. From 
the history of economic minerals, 
ownership of natural resources is 
important because they are valuable 
materials which can be used to develop 
society and sustain the ecosystem. That 
value is only most useful if society 
relate natural resources to man. From 
natural resources, so many other goods 
can be produced and that is why they are 
called capital assets. Thus they can 
facilitate the development of a country 
in a faster and robust ways. Also, 
countries that are very rich in lucrative 
natural resources are respected in 
international politics (Ololade, 2010: 3) 
These are some of the reasons 
ownership of natural resources has 
become critically important. So who 
owns the natural resources located in an 
area? 
According to Ololade (2010: 3),  
Ownership of resources has been 
given international recognition in a 
vast set of international regimes 
from the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 
1803 of 1962 to the Rio 
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Declaration on Environment and 
Development of 1992; it has even 
been recognized to be a sovereign 
right of a nation…UNGA 1803 of 
1962 in Article 1 provides that “the 
right of the peoples and nations to 
the permanent sovereignty over 
their natural wealth and resources 
must be exercised in the interest of 
their national development and of 
the wellbeing of the people of the 
state concerned”. While the Rio 
Declaration which follows in line 
with the Stockholm conference, 
provides in Article 2, that “States 
have, in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations and 
the principles of international law, 
the sovereign right to exploit their 
own resources pursuant to their 
own environmental and 
developmental policies, and the 
responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction 
or control do not cause damage to 
the environment of other States or 
of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction” (Ololade, 
2010:3). 
 
It is clear from these conventions that it 
is the state or nation or the general 
government that has the sovereign right 
to the ownership of natural resources 
domiciled in the state. To make this 
right effective, states enact or 
promulgate laws that enable them 
exercise this right and authority over the 
natural resources in their states. 
As a result, in Nigeria, the following 
laws were put in place to hand over 
natural resources, especially mineral 
resources, to the Federal Government of 
Nigeria (FGN): 
• The Minerals/Petroleum Decree, 1969 
• The Land Use Decree, 1978 
• The Oil Pipelines Decree, 1991 
• The Petroleum Decree, 1991 
• The National Inlands Waterways 
Authority Decree, 1997 (Tamuno, 
2011:24) 
However the UNGA Resolution 1803 of 
1962 specifically stated that “the right of 
the peoples and nations to the permanent 
sovereignty over their natural wealth 
and resources must be exercised in the 
interest of their national development 
and of the wellbeing of the people of the 
state concerned”.  
The crux of the matter here is both in 
ownership and development effect of 
natural resources on the wellbeing of the 
people where such resources are found. 
In the case of the Niger Delta people of 
Nigeria, they question the 
underdevelopment around them. This 
has led to the continuous fight and 
struggle against the FGN for denying 
them their right over the revenues 
accruing from crude oil. Why is the 
FGN not able to develop the region with 
the oil revenues? The study will use the 
Resource Curse Theory to explain this 
problem. 
 
2.3 The Resource Curse theory 
One of the most prominent theories of 
natural resources is the Resource Curse 
Theory also known as “The Paradox of 
Plenty”. The term “resource curse” was 
first coined by British economist 
Richard M. Auty in 1993 in his article 
titled: “Sustaining Development in the 
Mineral Economies: The Resource 
Curse Thesis”. The theory describes the 
“failure of many natural resource-rich 
countries to benefit fully from their 
natural resource wealth, and for 
governments in these countries to 
respond effectively to public welfare 
needs” (NRGI, 2015: para. 1). NRGI 
observes that  
“while one might expect to see 
better development outcomes after 
countries discover natural 
resources, resource-rich countries 
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tend to have higher rate of conflicts 
and authoritarianism, and lower 
rates of economic stability and 
growth, compared to their non-
resource-rich neighbors” (NRGI, 
2015: para. 1). 
 
This means that resource-rich countries 
suffer from unpleasant outcomes that 
militate against their development, 
while non-resource rich countries do 
not.  To further explain the resource 
curse, Alex Perry (2010: para. 2), 
asserted that resource cursed countries  
often develop more slowly, more 
corruptly, more violently and with 
more authoritarian governments 
than others. Think oil in Nigeria, 
blood diamonds in Sierra Leone 
and Angola, tin in Bolivia. What 
should be a blessing turns out to be 
an incentive for conflict and 
corruption and, in the wrong hands, 
a source of ruin (Perry, 2010).  
To support Alex Perry (2010) that this 
curse is mainly with underdeveloped 
countries like Nigeria, Sierra Leone, 
Angola and Bolivia, Ross (1999: 298) 
states that: 
Three-quarter of the states in sub-
Saharan Africa and two-thirds of 
those in Latin America, the 
Caribbean, North Africa, and the 
Middle East still depend on 
primary commodities (natural 
resources) for at least half of their 
export income. For these countries 
the “resource curse” is an urgent 
puzzle” (Ross, 1999: 298). 
 
Consequently the countries most 
affected and afflicted by the natural 
resource curse are underdeveloped 
countries from the regions listed above. 
Why are the natural-resource rich 
developed countries not affected and 
afflicted by the curse? As provided by 
Perry (2010) above, developed countries 
would not allow “corruption, violence 
and authoritarian government” convert 
their natural resources rich nature into 
“source of ruin”.  Another dimension of 
the theory is that this curse appears not 
to be with non-natural-resource-rich 
countries. Why? The answer is the 
absence of the “Dutch Disease”, a 
subset of the resource curse. In other 
words, this disease affects resource-rich 
economies. The disease simply refers to 
“all economic hardships associated with 
natural resource exports” (Ross, 1999: 
306). 
In summary, Oviasuyi and Uwadiae 
(2010: 117) state the 
Nigeria is the world‟s 13th largest 
oil producer, and the 6th largest in 
OPEC. In the domestic sector, from 
1970 to 1999, oil generated almost 
$231 billion for the Nigerian 
economy, constituting between 21 
and 48 percent of GDP. Nigeria has 
an estimated oil reserve of 32 
billion barrels – sufficient for 37 
years at the current rate of 
production. Between 2000 and 
2004, oil accounted for around 79.5 
percent of total government 
revenues and around 97 percent of 
foreign exchange revenues. This 
rise in oil wealth has not translated 
into significant increases in living 
standards in Nigeria. In fact, the 
rise in poverty and inequality 
coincides with the discovery and 
export of oil in Nigeria… this has 
led to widespread acceptance that 
Nigeria has suffered from the 
resource curse (Oviasuyi, 2010: 
117) 
Thus, Nigeria suffers from resource 
curse.  
 
2.4 The Effects of the Resource Curse 
The resource curse affects the economic, 
social and political lives of the state. 
The “Dutch Disease” is a prominent 
explanation of the economic effect of 
the resource curse. Basically, the “Dutch 
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Disease” describes an economic 
situation where  
a large increase in natural resource 
revenue can hurt other sectors of 
the economy, particularly export-
based manufacturing, by causing 
inflation or exchange rate 
appreciation and shifting labour 
and capital from the non-resource 
sector to the resource-sector. This 
is known as the Dutch disease 
(NRGI, 2015 as cited above).  
 
According to the International 
Competitiveness of the Russian 
Federation Journal, the origin of the 
Dutch Disease was that: 
In the late 1950s the appreciation 
of the Dutch currency (guilder), 
which followed the gas export 
boom, caused inflation which in 
turn, brought about reductions in 
competitiveness and profitability of 
the manufacturing and service 
sectors. … the total Dutch exports 
crashed relative to GDP during the 
1960s. Shortly, the expansion of 
gas exports in the 1960s not only 
crowded out the other 
manufacturing exports, but also 
reduced markedly the total Dutch 
exports relative to GDP.  
 
The effects of the disease are found in 
the contracting manufacturing and 
agricultural sectors, increase in 
unemployment, worsening inflation and 
exchange rates (Ross 1999 as above), to 
which he said the Dutch Disease:   
“Describes the combined influence 
of two effects that commonly 
follow resource booms. The first is 
the appreciation of a state’s real 
exchange rate caused by the sharp 
rise in exports; the second is the 
tendency of a booming resource 
sector to draw capital and labour 
away from a country’s 
manufacturing and agricultural 
sectors, raising their production 
costs. Together, these effects can 
lead to a decline in the export of 
agricultural and manufacturing 
goods and can inflate the cost of 
goods and services that cannot be 
imported (Ross, 1999 as above). 
 
With respect to Nigeria, a major 
exporter of crude oil, the country suffers 
these economic disabilities till date. The 
country’s manufacturing sector is 
underperforming, its agricultural sector 
is in comatose, rate of unemployment is 
high, inflation is galloping and exchange 
rate is very high and bad political 
leadership; thus all the symptoms in the 
theory can be found in the Nigerian 
economy. The Dutch Disease is the key 
economic ailment that frustrates the 
economic development of an afflicted 
society and enthrones the reign of a 
disarticulated economic regime which 
impedes economic development.  
 
Ross (1999) further identified other 
economic effects arising from the 
resource curse as decline in terms of 
trade, volatility in international resource 
prices which causes instability in the 
international natural resource market, 
poor economic linkages between 
resource and non-resource sectors. 
Resource curse also affects countries 
politically. Ross (1999) and Ploeg 
(2010) identified the following political 
effects on the state: cognitive problem, 
growth-impeding interests and 
weakening of state institutions. 
Cognitive problem arises in a natural 
resource exporting state when its leaders 
(public and private) become enmeshed 
in the revenue boom that they no longer 
can discern what useful things to do 
with the huge revenue. Ross (1999) 
states that cognitive effect creates 
resource-caused “myopic sloth, or 
myopic exuberance in policy makers”. 
For example, according to Ross (1999), 
development scholars such as Wallich 
and Levin accused leaders of a sugar-
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exporting state of approving and 
following a development part that is 
distorted by a “sugar mentality” which 
led to lax economic planning and 
insufficient diversification. Ross also 
reported that Nurske and Watkins 
suggested that resource rents lead to 
“irrational exuberance, producing a get-
rich-quick mentality among 
businessmen; a boom-bust psychology 
and shortsightedness among 
policymakers, marked by bouts of 
excessive optimism and frantic 
retrenchments”.  According to Ross 
(1999: 309), the idea was made popular 
in the Six Books of a Commonwealth by 
Bodin, who explained that:  
men of a fat and fertile soil, are most 
commonly effeminate and cowards, 
whereas contrariwise a barren 
country makes men temperate by 
necessity, and by consequence 
careful, vigilant and industrious.  
 
Finally, Ross (1999) concluded on the 
cognitive effect saying that “easy wealth 
leads to either paralysis or shortsighted 
euphoria among policymakers”. From 
these positions and reflecting on 
Nigeria, one can simply say that Nigeria 
is richly blessed with the effects of 
resource curse. 
There is also the social effect of the 
resource curse. It states that “resource 
booms enhance the political leverage of 
non-state actors who favour growth-
impeding policies” (Ross 1999: 310). 
Ross posits that this argument works 
best “when non-state actors have first 
claim on any resource rents”. Examples 
of such policies in Nigeria are import- 
substitution and subsidy policies. Thus, 
such “growth-impeding” policies are 
policies that will retard economic 
growth and leave more resources in the 
hands of interest groups whose ultimate 
ambition is selfish.  
There is also the state-centered effect of 
the resource curse. The state-centred 
effect states that when government 
depends mostly on resource rents, such 
governments tend not to levy taxes on 
citizens and become less accountable to 
the people and that this situation 
weakens state or public institutions 
(Ross, 1999). According to Ploeg 
(2010), many development scholars 
(Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000; Isham, 
2003; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 
2003; Robinson, 2006; Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2006 and Mehlum, 2006) 
posit that natural resource dominated 
economy weakens state institutions 
through increased institutional 
corruption, blocking of technological 
and institutional improvements and 
prevents the redistribution of political 
power towards the middle class. This 
situation prevents the adoption of 
growth-promoting policies and worsens 
the quality of institutions since it allows 
governments to pacify dissent, avoid 
accountability and resist modernization. 
Other means of weakening state 
institutions include granting of 
privileges to cronies, making access to 
political power more expensive, and 
bribing voters with well-paid but 
unproductive jobs. Finally, natural 
resource bonanza encourages productive 
entrepreneurs to shift to rent seeking and 
become rent grabbing-friendly 
institutions.  
Further study by Ascher (1999: 405-
412) reveals that “natural resources 
suffer from exceptionally poor 
governance, since state officials can 
easily manipulate their use to meet 
unpopular, controversial or illegal 
objectives” and showing “how clashes 
among government agencies have led to 
results ranging from Indonesia's 
deforestation to the collapse of the 
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Mexican water system, from the 
destruction of cocoa farms in Ghana to 
the waste of Nigeria's oil wealth”. 
What can be discerned from these 
scholars is that natural resources can 
yield sudden abundant revenues and that 
failure to manage it effectively and 
efficiently is due to natural resource 
curse.  
 
2.5 The Politics of Crude Oil in 
Nigeria  
As at 2017, sixty-one (61) years after 
crude oil was discovered in commercial 
quantity in Oloibiri, Bayelsa State, 
Nigeria, crude oil has remained the chief 
sustainer of Nigeria’s economy and has 
afflicted the country with the resource 
curse. Yet, the process and politics of 
crude oil administration by the Nigerian 
state have consistently yielded 
underdevelopment in the region and the 
country at large. 
The issues in the politics of crude oil in 
Nigeria include the establishment of 
state laws (as indicated earlier) that 
enabled the FGN to take over crude oil 
as a federal resource. The implication of 
these laws is that crude oil and indeed 
any other mineral resource, found in the 
Niger Delta or elsewhere, belongs to the 
FGN, which therefore controls all 
revenues accruable from the resource. 
Therefore, the regions or states where 
the resources are located have limited 
access to oil revenue. This has remained 
a source of trouble between Nigeria and 
the oil states which have consistently 
called for the abrogation of these laws. 
Another issue in the politics of crude oil 
in Nigeria is the volatility in revenue 
derivation percentage payable to the 
crude oil producing Niger Delta region. 
According to Tamuno (2011:6): 
The principle of Derivation in 
Revenue allocation has been 
consciously and systematically 
obliterated by successive regimes 
of the Nigerian State. We note the 
drastic reduction of the Derivation 
Principle from 100% (1953), 50% 
(1960), 45% (1970), 20% (1975), 
2% (1982), 1.5% (1984), to 3% 
(1992) and 13% (1999-date) 
(Tamuno, 2011:6). 
 
The derivation percentages determine 
how much of the oil revenue that should 
be given to the region or state. From the 
quotation above, the Niger Delta people 
have earned 100% in 1953, 50% in 
1960, but as at today, it is 13%. This is a 
major source for accusing the FGN of 
injustice. The Niger Delta people have 
argued that the revenue allocated to 
them from the federation account is not 
sufficient for the development of the 
region given its terrain and the 
devastations caused by crude oil 
exploitation. Hence their request for 
resource control. The FGN has refused 
to accede to such request on the grounds 
that the remaining 87% would be used 
to develop other parts of the country. 
Also the FGN has argued that the 
revenue allocated to the region could 
develop the area and that it was the 
mismanagement of allocations by the 
political leaders of the region that is 
responsible for the underdevelopment of 
the region (The Nation, 2014).  
From this politics, concepts like the 
“economy of conflicts” (Ikelegbe, 2005: 
209) and the” blood oil” (Asuni, 2009: 
1) have emerged. The economy of 
conflicts is a political theory which 
explains how the Niger Delta has been 
engulfed by the reign of terror, arms and 
ammunition which facilitate criminal 
activities by the youths. This reign has 
become a way of life of the people of 
the Niger Delta. These youths, with 
arms, kidnap oil workers for ransom, 
steal crude oil (refine some and sell 
some), blow-up oil pipes and so on. 
Their reason is that they use violence in 
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order to have access to the mineral 
wealth deposited in their soil. Asuni 
(2009: 1) describes blood oil as “The 
trade in stolen oil, or “blood oil,” which 
poses an immense challenge to the 
Nigerian state, harming its economy and 
fueling a long-running insurgency in the 
Niger Delta”. A combination of these 
concepts shows that the Niger Delta has 
become a beehive of massive arms, 
ammunition, criminality and conflicts. 
Can this fight for oil, fight against 
unemployment and poverty not have a 
way of influencing insurgency, terror 
and final attack on the unity of Nigeria? 
In the politics of crude oil in Nigeria, 
the issue of the relationship between the 
ethnic groups is important. History tells 
us that Nigeria has the Igbo, Hausa and 
Yoruba as the majority ethnic groups, 
while the rest are minorities. While the 
majorities control the central 
government, the minorities were carved 
into states and local governments. 
Meanwhile it is the central government 
that through its laws, owns, controls and 
administers crude oil resources; yet 
crude oil is domiciled and located in the 
lands of the minority ethnic groups in 
southern Nigeria. Consequently, on a 
regular basis, these minorities see crude 
oil laws made by the FGN as repressive, 
marginalizing and uncaring, thereby 
fostering the agitations against the 
federal government. These agitations 
have led to the call for the restructuring 
of Nigeria to grant self-determination to 
the states or minority ethnics. The 
federal government is not ready to 
accede to this request, rather it has taken 
some actions to resolve and assuage the 
anger among the ethnic minority oil 
producing states. These actions are 
interpreted by the Niger Deltans as 
positive or negative. The concern of this 
study is that this ethnic dimension of the 
oil politics can combine with the factor 
of high insecurity in the Niger Delta and 
lead to disintegration of the country. For 
example it happened in the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 
December 1990 (Beissinger, 2009).  
 
2.6 Federal Government’s responses 
to the Niger Delta crisis 
In response to the agitations by the 
minority ethnic crude oil producing 
states, the FGN has taken the following 
actions to respond and assuage the crises 
and ensure the development of the 
region. These responses could be 
interpreted as positive or negative as 
indicated below: 
 
    Table 1: Responses from the Federal Government of Nigeria 
Serial number Positive Responses Negative 
Responses/Results 
1 Established the Willink’s Commission 1957 to 
examine the fears of the Niger Delta people 
before the attainment of Nigeria’s independence 
in 1960 
The killing of Isaac Adaka 
Boro 1967 
2 Created the River Basin Development 
Authority(RBDA) 1961 
Army invasion of 
Umuechem 1991 
3 Creation of Mid-West region and States 1963, 
1967, 1986 and 1996 and local councils 
Genocide in Ogoni and the 
killing of Ogoni 13 
including Kenule Saro-
Wiwa 1994-1995 
4 Established the Oil Mineral Producing Areas 
Development Commission (OMPADEC) 1992 
The invasion of Choba 
1999 and Odi 2000 
5 Granted 13% Special Allocation to oil 
producing states 1995 
The non-implementation of 
the UNEP Report since 
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August 2011* 
6 Established the Niger Delta Development 
Commission (NDDC) 2000 
 
7 Established the Amnesty Programme 2009  
8 Established the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs 
2009 
 
     (Sources: UNDP Niger Delta Report 2006; Tamuno, 2011 and NEITI Report 2013) 
 
(*The UNEP Report was the report by 
the United Nations Environmental 
Programme on the clean-up of 
Ogoniland. It was submitted to the FGN 
in August 2011. But the FGN is yet to 
carry out the assignment and it has 
become an issue among the Ogoni 
people in particular and the Niger Delta 
in general). Source: www.unep.org, 
2011.  
The obvious conclusion on the politics 
of crude oil in Nigeria is that it has 
showcased and made stronger the issues 
of injustice and marginalization, high-
handedness in the responses by the 
Federal government and has led to high 
assemblage and stockpiling of arms and 
ammunition and many criminal 
activities in the Niger Delta. It also has 
kept aglow the burning issue of 
ethnicity. It has probably further 
frustrated the effective utilization of oil 
revenue for the development of the 
country. The mismanagement of crude 
oil revenue has led to poverty in 
Nigeria. According to the poverty theory 
of the social sciences, material poverty 
is the chief source of anger, restiveness 
and conflicts in society (Oviasuyi and 
Uwadiae, 2010). There is a possibility 
that the poverty induced aggression in 
the Niger Delta can combine with the 
poverty in other parts of Nigeria to a 
total breakdown of law and order and 
unleash a mass insurrection against the 
Nigeria state. This precarious situation 
can facilitate the collapse of the 
Nigerian state. 
3.0 Analysis of the Consequences of 
Resource Curse on Nigeria 
From the literature of the resource curse 
espoused above, this study can present 
some textual analyses that will enhance 
the understanding of why Nigeria has 
remained underdeveloped. The study 
will concentrate on the political and 
economic consequences of the resource 
curse on Nigeria.  
The political effects are the cognitive, 
growth-impeding and state-centered 
consequences. According to Ross (1999: 
309), the cognitive problem is that in 
natural resource countries, the leaders 
always suffer from the “inability to 
discern what other useful things to do 
with the revenue boom” and that this 
inability causes “lax in good economic 
planning and insufficient 
diversification”. Many may disagree 
with this explanation by arguing that 
Nigeria had economic development 
plans in the past. Unfortunately, most of 
the development plans were for 
infrastructural development and few 
giant industrial set ups. For example, the 
steel plants were to produce steel for 
infrastructural constructions. The 
refineries were to produce fuel for local 
consumption, not for exports. The 
thinking ought to be for local 
consumption and export. Diversification 
of the Nigerian economy has been on 
the drawing board of nearly every 
regime (both military and civilian). Yet, 
fifty seven (57) years after Nigeria’s 
political independence, the economy is 
not diversified such that many industrial 
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sectors are able to contribute 
significantly to development, instead of 
relying majorly on crude oil.  
Ross (1999:309) stated that Nurske and 
Watkins suggested that resource rents 
lead to “irrational exuberance, 
producing a get-rich-quick mentality 
among businessmen; a boom-bust 
psychology and shortsightedness among 
policymakers, marked by bouts of 
excessive optimism and frantic 
retrenchments”. The point here is that 
even when policy makers and business 
owners think and try to discern, the 
outcome is mostly irrational because the 
philosophy behind the discernment is to 
make quick selfish gains. This is 
shortsightedness which would lead to 
reversal and abandonment of 
programmes and retrenchment of 
labour. Such abandoned programmes 
are numerous in Nigeria: the Operation 
Feed the Nation( 1976-1979); the Green 
Revolution (1980-1983); School-to-land 
(1984-85); SAP, DIFRRI, Better Life 
and Poverty Eradication Programme 
(1985-1993); NEEDS and SEEDS ( 
1999-2007); Seven-Point Agenda 
(2007-2009); Transformation Agenda, 
SURE-P, Mass Transit (2010-2015); 
and so on. All those who worked for and 
in these programmes have, most 
probably, lost their jobs. During the 
General Ibrahim Babangida regime 
(1985-1993), he created two political 
parties, the Social Democratic Party 
(SDP) and the National Republican 
Convention (NRC). The government 
built political offices for these parties in 
all the local government areas in 
Nigeria. Notwithstanding this, and as at 
today in 2017, Nigeria’s five major 
political parties do not have access nor 
use such offices. This is a waste from oil 
revenue. 
 
On the problem of get-rich-quick 
mentality among business organizations, 
the society can easily see it in their 
operations. For example, Nigerian banks 
prefer to finance traders who can make 
fast returns than finance agribusiness. 
This is one reason agribusiness is not 
progressing the in the country. 
According to Ross (1999), the cognitive 
problem indicates that men who live in 
good conditions, tend to be risk averse 
and less industrious. Such good 
condition is like oil boom with plenty of 
revenue. At such times, men are 
consumers of goods, care less and 
wasteful due to abundance. But in 
austere times, men tend to be wiser, 
careful, vigilant, and productive risk 
takers. Nigeria is in the first category 
and this explains the consumerist 
society we have in the country. Nigeria 
relies on oil money for over 80 percent 
of the country’s budget financing. A less 
productive economy is a recipe for 
underdevelopment and poverty and its 
attendant class struggles that lead to 
national conflicts as depicted in the 
Niger Delta.  
Resource curse generates growth-
impeding interests and policies. These 
are actions that are unproductive, but 
merely meant to serve the interest of 
those in government. For example, in 
Nigeria, some of such actions by the 
government include oil subsidy and 
SURE-P. Oil subsidy means that the 
government pays the cost-mark up 
difference on fuel importation. For 
instance, if it takes the oil importer $2 to 
import a litre of fuel up to Nigeria’s 
coast, and it takes another $1 to clear it 
and another $0.5 to bring it to the filling 
station and his profit markup is $1, the 
price to sell the liter will be $4.50. If the 
exchange rate is N100 per dollar, the 
selling price of the litre in Nigeria will 
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be N450. But to Nigerians, this price is 
too high and this will lead to labour 
demonstrations. So the government in 
other to save its face, will agree with the 
fuel importer to sell at N80 per litre and 
collect the balance of N370 from the 
government. It is this N370 that is called 
oil or fuel subsidy. But towards the end 
of the Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan’s 
administration, it was discovered by the 
then Finance Minister, Dr. Ngozi 
Okonjo-Iweala that the entire fuel 
selling price determination process was 
not sincere. This was because, despite 
the subsidy, fuel was still scarce. So the 
present President Mohammadu Buhari’s 
government decided to stop paying 
subsidy and demanded Nigerians to pay 
for the actual price of N145 per litre 
they agreed with the fuel importers. 
Since June 2016, Nigerians have not 
experienced serious fuel scarcity and 
this proved the point of growth-
impeding actions of government, meant 
to help the unproductive political 
“boys”. Another example is the SURE-P 
which the last administration created to 
reduce the sufferings of Nigerians 
arising from scarcity of fuel. SURE-P 
was meant to provide unproductive jobs 
for political patrons and their aids and 
assistants. It is the crude oil money that 
has been able to sustain such selfish 
irrational unproductive actions that bled 
the economy. The result is further 
underdevelopment and poverty of the 
masses of Nigeria. 
 
Ploeg (2010) posits that revenue boom 
from natural resources unleash weak 
state institutions and corruption in the 
operations of the government, blocks 
technological and institutional 
improvements, prevents the 
redistribution of power towards the 
middle class, allows the government to 
pacify dissent, avoids accountability, 
resists modernization and grants 
privileges to cronies. Oil riches ruin 
long-term preference of the economies 
of resource rich states, raise the value of 
being in power and induce politicians to 
unnecessarily expand public sectors by 
creating more well paid but 
unproductive jobs. All these are acts of 
bad governance which had gone a long 
way to sustain poverty, restiveness and 
conflicts in Nigeria. Thus it creates 
room for mass insurrection and revolt 
against the Nigeria state. 
 
Natural resource revenue boom 
encourages enterprises to shift efforts to 
rent seeking and become rent-grabbing-
friendly institutions. The implication of 
this is the absence of genuine 
entrepreneurs, contraction of 
productivity and the expansion of 
unemployment, low income, poverty 
and lack which lead to the anger, 
restiveness and crisis. This is one reason 
for the steadily rising sectional crises in 
the North East (Boko Haram), South 
East ( request for Biafra) and Niger 
Delta (Resource Control) in Nigeria. 
 
Ascher (1999) found that natural 
resources suffer from exceptionally poor 
governance. This can be seen at all 
levels of governance in Nigeria. 
 
On the economic front, the availability 
of huge revenue from natural resources 
has the effect of discouraging 
government from industrialization 
which will enable more employment 
and ensures that taxation remains the 
major source of revenue for the 
government. When tax is the key source 
of revenue, it means that people are 
taxed more, and such people will be 
interested in what government do with 
the tax funds. When people perceive 
misuse of tax revenue by the 
government, they will demand for 
accountability. But if crude oil is the 
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main source of revenue to the 
government, taxation will not be 
attractive as an important source of 
revenue to the government. 
Consequently, the people would be 
taxed low and some may easily evade or 
avoid tax successfully.  In such 
situation, when people perceive misuse 
of public funds by the government, they 
may not demand for accountability. This 
leaves the government to be care less 
with public funds and become 
unaccountable. That is why Nigerians 
are hardly on the streets to demand for 
accountability and good governance. 
Another economic consequence of the 
resource curse is the presence of too 
much money chasing too few goods and 
this equals to inflation. With high level 
of prices, other sectors of the economy 
suffer because the crude oil sector which 
is now attractive and booming with 
petro-dollars, will buy off most quality 
labour and attract large chunk of the 
available capital. Thus the 
manufacturing, agricultural and other 
sectors will suffer stagnation. This is the 
reason other sectors except oil and gas, 
are not contributing significantly to 
Nigeria’s GDP. The ultimate 
consequence is a mono-product 
economy which suffers from price 
shocks once the price of the 
commanding natural resource falls. The 
recent recession in Nigeria is chiefly 
caused by the drop in the price of crude 
oil from over $100 per liter to as low as 
$28 by the last quarter of 2016. At such 
periods total revenue drops and budget 
implementation by the government 
becomes very difficult. The bottom line 
is excruciating hardship and poverty 
among the people. 
 
Resource curse ensures the continued 
reliance and export of unprocessed 
natural resource to other countries. 
Nigeria has continued to export crude 
oil for over 61 years now with the 
attendant loss of all the bye-products of 
crude oil which would have enabled the 
establishment of many gas and 
petrochemical plants in the country. The 
massive employment, tax incomes and 
exports revenue from such companies 
have all been lost to the continued 
export of Nigeria’s crude oil. The 
consequences are also in increasing 
unemployment, youth restiveness and 
increasing crime rates in Nigeria, which 
are manifestations of underdevelopment 
and future crises in the country. 
 
The continued export of unrefined oil is 
a corollary to the point that such 
behavior discourages diversification of 
the national economy as the country 
prefers easy rent income from the 
natural resource. Why? The reason is 
that there is no organic or structural 
relationship between the natural 
resource sector and the rest sectors. Ake 
(1981) referred to such economy as a 
disarticulated economy. Nigeria’s 
economy is a good example of such an 
economy. In a structured, diversified 
and articulated economy, raw materials 
from one sector is fed into and used by 
other sectors for further reprocessing to 
produce more products or commodities.  
The bottom line is that there is no 
economic linkage between the rich-
resource sector and other non-rich -
resource sectors leading to a 
disarticulated economy which will 
continue to support underdevelopment 
and its attendant social crises. 
 
The resource curse causes the economy 
that relies mainly on the sale of natural 
resource to suffer from the volatility in 
international price of the resource. As 
indicated earlier, when such price falls, 
it can lead to economic downturns like 
recession or depression. If the price goes 
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up, more revenue accrues to the nation 
and this could be mistakenly seen as 
economic development. But the 
mismanagement of such boom through 
corruption caused by the resource curse 
brings back the economy to prostration, 
frustration and underdevelopment. 
 
The social consequences of the resource 
curse are increasing labour mobility in 
favour of the urban cities, the 
depopulation of the rural areas which 
affects agricultural productivity 
negatively, and high rate of youth 
unemployment in the cities resulting in 
more crimes in the cities. There is 
always the unplanned effects of the 
overpopulation and crowding of such 
urban areas. One of such effects is the 
high demand for and pressure on the 
infrastructure in the urban cities. In 
Nigeria, Lagos and other capital cities of 
some states are good examples.  
By and large, resource curse harms the 
economy and contributes largely to the 
continued underdevelopment and 
material poverty in resource dominated 
economies like Nigeria’s. But the 
consistent underdevelopment of Nigeria 
arising from poor political leadership 
which in itself is a child of the resource 
curse, is the nexus between crude oil 
and the collapse of Nigeria. This is the 
thesis of the findings of this research. 
 
 
 
 
4.0 Summary and Conclusion 
Nigeria is blessed with crude oil as a 
natural resource. It has been a source of 
the bulk of government’s funding. 
Despite the huge funds it provides to 
government, the political leadership of 
Nigeria has not been able to translate 
this into the development of the country. 
This is as a result of the resource curse 
which inflicts its effects and 
consequences on the people. One of its 
afflictions is poor political leadership in 
the management of the natural resource, 
which has led to the underdevelopment 
of the country, more acute in the Niger 
Delta region where crude oil is 
produced. As a result, agitations and 
conflicts in arms abound. 
Underdevelopment also affects other 
Nigerians. Can the arms crisis in the 
Niger Delta ignite a national revolt 
against underdevelopment and poverty? 
Can such a revolt lead to the 
disintegration of Nigeria into national 
pieces? This study observes that if the 
resource curse continues under poor 
political leadership, the possibility of 
such a revolt against Nigeria is possible. 
 
The conclusion therefore is that 
Nigeria’s political leadership needs to 
urgently tackle the resource curse and 
commence immediately the remediation 
of the age-long damages caused by this 
curse and begin a new Nigeria with keen 
interest in true development anchored 
on good governance. 
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